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This sense of the word  (abstractness) is  important, and the
logicians  are quite right to  stress  it,  since  it  embodies a truism
which a good many people who  ought to know better are  apt to forget.
It  is  quite common, for example, for an astronomer or  a physicist to
claim that he has found a 'mathematical proof' that  the physical
universe must behave in a particular way.  All  such claims,  if
interpreted literally,  are strictly nonsense.  It cannot be possible
to prove mathematically that there will be an eclipse  to-morrow,
because eclipses,  and other physical phenomena, do not form part of
the  abstract world of mathematics;  and this,  I suppose, all
astronomers would admit when pressed, however many eclipses  they may
have predicted correctly.
G. H. Hardy  (p. 47)
In 1987,  the American Journal  of Agricultural Economics printed what
is  surely the most radical  analysis of farmer behavior  in the history of
human thought:
"Farm households, therefore,  solve
(1)  max  J  u(c(t),  H - Ll(t)  - L2(t))e 6t  dt,
c,L1 ,L2
subject to
(i)  E  - p(E(t),  Ll(t),  v) + wL2(t) + y(t) - c(t)
(ii)  E(O) - E."  (Chambers and Lopez,  p. 370)
At least I thought  it was a radical analysis.  I later discovered
that  it is  a rather common notion among certain researchers  that  farmers
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1routinely tackle even the most intractable of equations.  For  example,  the
1988 AAEA Outstanding Journal Article award went to  the developer of an
econometric model which required data "assumed to be  generated by  farmers
solving a single-period maximization problem".  (Antle, p. 510)
Nor do  only farmers reach for their trusty calculus books  in  times of
crisis.  When milk was found to  be contaminated in Hawaii, the hapless
citizens  of Oahu found their problem to  be one of solving this beauty:
"max L - U(Xi(Zi(N)),X 2)  + A(I  - PX  - P2X2 - CN)"
(Smith et al.,  p. 513)
Even though many agricultural  economists have assumed farmers solve
equations, none have reported the names and addresses  of those  farmers.
To make matters worse,  the  farmers I work with are either not of the
equation solving variety or  too modest to admit to  being so.  This being
the  case, I am left with little  choice but  to  adopt the working
hypothesis that farmers  do not really solve these equations.  I offer my
apologies  to  those who claim they do,  however, and encourage  them to keep
a sharp eye out for these most interesting of life forms.  My task here
will be the more modest one  of investigating  the wisdom of assuming that
farmers finish up a hard day in the fields with a bout of equation
solving.
I suspect that most would, with a quick tip of the hat to  Milton
Friedman's defense  of "positive economics",  say that farmers merely act
"as  if"  they solved equations.  Most  economists have  at one  time  or
another  spent some time with Friedman in his world where  leaves  on a tree
act  "as  if each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount  of
sunlight  it receives,  given the position of its  neighbors,  as  if  it  knew
2the physical laws determining the amount of sunlight that would be
received in various positions  and could move  rapidly and instantaneously
from any one position to  any other desired and unoccupied position".
(Friedman, p. 19)  This world, too,  is one  in which an expert billiard
player acts  "as  if he knew the complicated mathematical  formulas that
would give the  optimum directions of travel, could estimate accurately by
eye  the  angles, etc.,  describing the  location of the balls, could make
lightning calculations  from the formulas,  and could  then make the balls
travel  in the direction indicated by the  formulas."  (Friedman, p. 21).
"As  if"  turns  out to be a powerful concept,  indeed, in the hands of a
positive economist.  It,  in effect, frees one  from mundane concerns over
the truth of assumptions.  Only how the results of analysis beginning with
"as  if"  coincide with observations of reality need matter.  We  therefore
need not worry about whether farmers  solve  equations,  so  long as  they  act
as  if they do.
Let me add one more  "as  if"  to Friedman's collection:  "The gunfire
pierced the night as  if it were thundering".  This  type of  statement, the
simple simile, has been around for a long time.  It  is  often descriptive
to compare  two unlike things such  as  gunfire and thunder.  Properly
applied, similes  add richness  in normal conversation and beauty in poetry.
The simile belongs  to  the world of individual perception.  While I
might think gunfire  sounds like thunder, you may disagree.  If so,  the
value of my simile  in communication with you  is  clearly limited.  Whether
gunfire really  sounds  like thunder may even become a point of contention
and thereby seriously hamper our originally-intended conversation.  We
3must therefore choose our similes  to reflect the  common experience of
many if clarity of conversation is  our goal.
To say that leaves  know physics,  that billiard players mimic high
speed computers,  or  that  farmers  solve equations are also similes;  no
more,  no less.  They relate what  is,  in the eye  of the beholder, a common
property shared by two dissimilar worlds.  These particular similes  are,
in my opinion, so poorly chosen that  their fantastic nature  detracts from
clear conversation.  This  in no way, of course,  implies  that their authors
feel  otherwise.
While authors may choose  similes as  they see  fit,  they may not use
them beyond their conventional descriptive  limits.  The  simile provides no
basis whatsoever for logical analysis.  The mathematician G. H. Hardy was
moved by a particularly fine piece  of poetic simile  to comment:  "Could
lines be better, and could ideas be at once more trite  and more  false?"
(p. 24)  It makes good sense to say that gunfire sounds  like  thunder, but
no sense whatsoever to  further infer  that the presence of gunfire means
rainfall  is  imminent.
Let me consider more closely the argument  from gunfire  to  thunder to
rainfall.  I will write it  as  follows:
(1) Gunfire sounds  as  if  it  is  thundering.
(2) Thunder is  associated with rainfall.
(3) Gunfire sounds  as  if it  is  raining.
In  (1),  I apply simile.  Then, in  (2),  I use thunder  to  introduce
rainfall.  I conclude  in  (3) that gunfire sounds  like  rain.
What went wrong?  The key step  in the argument  is  that  the  initial
simile is  used to  introduce a theory  (meteorology) which has nothing to
4do with gunfire.  All sorts  of weather-related similes about gunfire can
then be  generated.  Most will be absurd, even though a few like  "gunfire
looks  as  if it were lightning" may be appealing.  But none of these
conclusions, absurd or  otherwise, can claim validity because meteorology
was used.  Nor is  the  argument that gunfire looks  like lightning because
gunfire sounds like  thunder any more  "rigorous"  than if the lightning
simile had been simply stated as  an observation.  Meteorology has nothing
to  say about gunfire, and no simile  is going to  change  that.
The digression into the  sound of gunfire now complete, I return to
the  connection "as  if" provides between mathematics  and farmers who solve
equations.  A typical argument might go  like this:
(1)  Farmers  act as  if  they solve a particular equation.
(2)  We can derive some  result A from the equation.
(3)  Farmers  act as  if result A holds.
In a particularly  striking example of  this  type of  reasoning, Chambers and
Lopez  state that one of the  equations they have derived "implies  that
farmers work both on and off the  farm."  (p. 371)  That farmers work on and
off the  farm is  obvious;  that mathematics has  anything to  say about where
farmers work is  far  less  obvious.
The farmer syllogism has  exactly the same  structure as  that
concerning gunfire and thunder.  It begins with a simile relating two very
different worlds.  Then, in  its second step, a theory appropriate  for one
part of the simile  (equation solving)  is  assumed to apply  to  the  second
part of the  simile  (farmer behavior).  Mathematics, rather than
meteorology, is  then used to  derive new results from the equation farmers
5"solve."  The argument ends by concluding one of the new mathematical
results  also applies to farmers.
The  implications of using mathematics  in the  farmer example are  the
same as  those of using meteorology in the  gunfire example.  The conclusion
in  the farmer syllogism may or may not be true.  The  fact that  it  was
derived mathematically tells us nothing more  than we should be suspicious
because  the conclusion was drawn inappropriately.  Furthermore, should we
find the  conclusion appealing, it would still be preferable to  simply
approach it directly as an "as  if".  At least then it would not be cloaked
in false claims of "rigor",  "proof",  or  "deduction".
In short, the mathematics  in the farmer argument, no matter how
sophisticated, contributes nothing.  This conclusion, while perhaps a bit
unsettling for research in agricultural economics, would not bother most
mathematicians.  To quote Bertrand Russell:
We are prepared to  say  that one and one are  two,  but not that  Socrates
and Plato are  two, because,  in our capacity of logicians  or pure
mathematicians,  we have never heard of  Socrates and Plato.  A world in
which there were no such individuals would still be a world in which
one and one  are  two.  It  is  not open to us,  as pure mathematicians  or
logicians,  to mention anything at all, because, if we do  so,  we
introduce something irrelevant and not formal.  (pp. 196-7)
I now turn to  this question:  "If Bertrand Russell was unwilling  to
use mathematics  in mentioning anything at  all, why is  our profession so
hell-bent on using it  to mention virtually everything?"
One often hears  that mathematics  adds  rigor to  arguments.  But I have
shown that our use of mathematics depends on the  least rigorous of all
claims, the simile, the  "as  if".  Anything, no matter how absurd, can be
shown with the  "as  if"  con game.  We  can "rigorously" show that gunfire
sounds  like rainfall  or that farmers buy  infinitely divisible tractors.
6Then, too, mathematics  is  at  times said to  somehow "quantify" things.
Granted, mathematics  is  comfortably at home when farmers and their
products are being counted, when interest rates  are being calculated, and
when budgets are being prepared.  But this  is  not what  is being done in
modelling.  In modelling, statements about how the world works are made in
the language  of mathematics.  Nothing is  quantified in this  process;  one
simply substitutes one language for another.  And, as we have seen, the
choice of mathematics  as  a language  to describe farmer behavior  is no
better than that of meteorology as a language to  describe gunfire.
We also hear claims that using mathematics  somehow simplifies our
analyses.  For example, Chambers  and Lopez  assume that farmers  "derive
utility not only from consumption during  their current lives but also  from
future descendants  future consumption"  (p.370) on into infinity.  Why make
buying a candy bar such a complicated decision?  The  answer:  "for analytic
simplicity".  (p. 370).  And, too, why  does Antle want  to  assume all
farmers  are solving single-period maximization problems?  Again,  it  is
"to  simplify the presentation".  (p. 510).
Claiming that framing discussions.  of the farm economy in
mathematical terms so complicated that only a very few can participate
adds simplicity is  curious,  to say the least.  There is  one  sense,
however,  in which simplicity  does arise  from the passion for mathematics:
the  subject matter content of arguments and ensuing journal articles
becomes very simple,  indeed.  Complex mathematics do not make  for complex
statements about reality;  in fact, Russell  seems  to be saying  the
opposite.  The more rigor we demand'from mathematics, the more we
7sacrifice any connection with reality, and the  fewer observations of a
non-trivial nature we are  able  to make.
Take,  for example,  the work of Lee and Chambers.  After leading the
reader through many pages bristling with equations,  they come  to the
following important  (their term) conclusion:  "Farmers do not face a
perfectly elastic  supply of funds or  credit upon which they can
effortlessly draw to finance their production decisions".  (p. 865)  We
are  somehow, one supposes,  to now feel more  comfortable  in holding what is
perfectly obvious  to  everyone.  But maybe not, because the  authors finally
admit  that "a conclusive resolution of the  issue awaits a more  thorough
empirical study".  (p. 865)
As  another example, Just and Zilberman challenge  the venerable  "law
of supply" by pointing out that higher product prices may also bring
about more  price risk.  This  can cause risk averse producers  to  diversify
into  other crops in spite of  the higher prices.  Particularly since  the
authors only claim "may" for  their statement,  the results appear  to need
no  further defense  (save for a possible  remark or  two on why such trivial
matters need to be  in the literature at all).  But instead of ending their
article at  the end of the second paragraph, the  authors  take  the reader on
a ten-page mathematical steeplechase, only to conclude what was already
stated quite nicely in the  introduction.
Is  there an alternative  to mathematics?  One  that  is  sometimes
overlooked, but nonetheless a good candidate,  is natural language--plain
English, if you will.  We often see even the most enthusiastic  of math
purveyors resort  to an occasional  "intuitive explanation" of their models.
These  lapses into natural  language are somehow intended, one supposes,  to
8clarify what the equations  are saying anyway.  What they are  in fact
doing, however,  is  clarifying what the  authors would be saying if  they
weren't using the mathematics.  In short, they are  trying to communicate
with natural language.
The attempt at  introducing natural language through the back door of
intuitive explanations has  its problems.  The main one  is  that  the
intuitive explanation and the mathematics  are not related in any formal
way.  What, for example,  is  intuitive about farm profits which are  "twice
continuously differentiable and convex in v, nondecreasing in output
prices, nonincreasing  in input prices, positively linearly homogeneous  in
v, and nondecreasing  in L1 and K"?  (Chambers and Lopez,  p.  371)  Later,
these same authors provide us with "for any given level of wealth, farmers
maximize  their net farm income by choosing an optimal combination of
outputs,  inputs,  and investment."  (p. 371)  To  claim that this explanation
of farmer behavior is  true is  one  thing;  to  claim it  is  somehow inherent
in the  equations  and their properties  is  quite  another.
But why bother with the equations,  anyway?  The so-called  intuitive
explanation contains  all that  is  necessary to reach the practical
conclusions  of most articles.  Natural language and a little elementary
logic can serve our purposes quite nicely.  If we as a profession would
only accept natural language as  a proper means of discourse  on important
matters, we would be freed to  address complex issues without so  many
"simplifying assumptions":  that  is,  in non-trivial ways.
Farmers  don't solve equations.  Perhaps we  shouldn't,  either.
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